The Italian government’s Decree Law No. 36/2025, issued on March 28, 2025, introduces a dramatic shift in the legal framework for Italian citizenship iure sanguinis. The decree—currently under review by the First Commission of the Senate, chaired by Senator Alberto Balboni—imposes significant restrictions on access to citizenship by descent, limiting recognition to a maximum of two generations and introducing automatic exclusion rules, primarily affecting individuals of Italian descent born abroad. For more information, please visit our news section.
While the First Commission (Constitutional Affairs) is leading the process through extensive hearings with legal experts, court officials, and stakeholders, other Senate commissions are also examining Decree Law No. 36/2025 within the scope of their respective areas. These include the Second Commission (Justice), the Third Commission (Foreign Affairs and Defense), and the Fifth Commission (State Budget). However, their discussions remain limited to technical or sectoral aspects of the decree. The First Commission remains the most crucial, as matters of citizenship fall directly within its jurisdiction and legislative competence.
This decree must be converted into law by May 27, 2025, within 60 days of its publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale (Italian Law Journal). The first phase of parliamentary debate is now taking place in the Senate. The First Commission held key hearings on April 8, 9, and 10, with additional sessions scheduled for April 15 and 16. The Commission is expected to conclude its hearings and submit proposed amendments by April 16 at 5:00 p.m. (Rome time). These amendments will serve as the basis for further parliamentary discussion and could significantly shape the final version of the law.
We have collected below the most important hearings held so far by leading legal experts, whose opinions are of significant value for our continuing defense of the citizenship rights of Italian descendants.
Senate – 1st Commission (Constitutional Affairs) – Hearing of April 8, 2025
Professor Sandro De Nardi, Constitutional Law, University of Padua
A key testimony during the Senate hearing of April 8 came from Professor Sandro De Nardi, professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Padua. His contribution focused on the constitutional dimension of citizenship law and the legitimacy of the reform proposed by Decree Law No. 36/2025.
Professor De Nardi began by noting that all past citizenship laws in Italy, including Law No. 91 of 1992, were based on the idea of unlimited transmission of citizenship by descent. This, in his view, created a structural imbalance, placing the State in a position where it could no longer control its own population, with the emergence of what he called “virtual Italians” or “sleeping Italians” who could awaken their rights at any time.
He recalled that this concern had already emerged during a conference held at the University of Padua in 2023, which he chaired, bringing together legal scholars, mayors, and public administration officials.
Professor De Nardi argued that the previous legal model suffers from multiple constitutional weaknesses. In particular, he emphasized that a population must have a real, effective link with its territory, not merely a paper or bureaucratic connection. A significant portion of the Italian citizenry residing permanently abroad, without tangible ties to Italy, risks undermining the very notion of territory as a constitutional element of the State.
He also noted that the unlimited transmission of citizenship can have direct consequences on political institutions, including the quorum for national referendum and the quorum needed for Italy to change to premiership. With a growing number of non-resident citizens eligible to vote, the numerical thresholds required for democratic procedures—such the one above—would become increasingly difficult to reach.
Turning to constitutional jurisprudence, Professor De Nardi cited Judgment No. 25 of 2025 by the Italian Constitutional Court, which ruled in favor of granting citizenship to a disabled applicant (wife of an Italian citizen) who could not attend the required language test. The Court stated that lawmakers must act within the bounds of reasonableness and proportionality, especially in areas concerning fundamental rights such as citizenship. These principles, in his view, should guide both legislative discretion and judicial review.
On the controversial issue of limiting transmission to two generations, Professor De Nardi emphasized that the choice of how many generations to include falls within the political discretion of Parliament. Whether it is two, three, or four generations is a legitimate legislative decision—as long as it respects constitutional limits.
Regarding the use of a decree law for such a sensitive matter, he acknowledged existing concerns, as citizenship law is of constitutional relevance and normally deserves a full parliamentary process. However, he defended the government’s decision by pointing to the urgency created by the high volume of applications and the risk of an overwhelming surge in court cases and municipal filings had the reform been delayed. In his view, this justified the use of emergency legislation.
He also addressed Article 22 of the Italian Constitution, which prohibits the loss of citizenship for political reasons. In his opinion, DL36 does not violate this provision, since the reform is not politically motivated but rather aims to correct an objectively unreasonable legal situation.
Finally, on the issue of retroactivity, Professor De Nardi recognized that the principle of legal certainty is a cornerstone of constitutional order. Nevertheless, he argued that retroactive application of civil law may be justified under exceptional circumstances—particularly when it serves to protect other constitutionally significant rights or interests. In this case, the retroactive nature of the reform may be seen as proportionate to the need to uphold the integrity of the Italian legal and institutional system.
Senate – 1st Commission (Constitutional Affairs) – Hearing of April 9, 2025
Dr. Salvatore Laganà, Former President (2024) of the Court of Venice
One of the most striking testimonies came from Dr. Salvatore Laganà, former President of the Tribunal of Venice. Although retired since December 2024, he was invited as a legal consultant and longtime observer of citizenship litigation in Italian courts.
Dr. Laganà offered an alarming overview: The Tribunal of Venice now handles over 50% of all citizenship lawsuits in Italy, amounting to roughly 29,000 active cases—[with the total number of petitioners] far exceeding the population of Venice itself.
He attributed this overload to the failure of consular services abroad—especially in the U.S. and Latin America—to provide timely appointments, forcing thousands to seek court recognition of citizenship rights.
Before addressing the substance of the reform, Dr. Laganà raised two general preliminary points. First, he recalled the 2022 rulings of the United Sections of the Court of Cassation, which stated that citizenship iure sanguinis is not meant to extend indefinitely and may be subject to generational limits, based on the principle of effectiveness—a concept rooted in EU jurisprudence that emphasizes a strong connection between citizenship and the nation. Second, he noted that Article 51 of the Italian Constitution distinguishes between Italian citizens and persons of Italian descent who are not part of the Italian Republic.
On the legal merits, Dr. Laganà argued that Article 3 of DL36 effectively revokes—ex nunc (from now on)—Italian citizenship acquired at birth. This principle of acquisition at birth was confirmed by the Court of Cassation in 2009, which also declared that citizenship, once acquired, is permanent, imprescriptible, and can be judicially claimed at any time upon proof of birth to an Italian parent. He emphasized that court rulings in these cases are declarative, merely affirming a pre-existing right—not constitutive, creating a new one.
As a result, the newly introduced Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, as amended by DL36, strips individuals of a legal status they had acquired by operation of law—one that existed until midnight on March 27, 2025.
Dr. Laganà acknowledged that lawmakers may legally enact such changes, but he stressed that they must be fully aware that they are depriving individuals—starting from the date of the decree—of Italian citizenship rights previously held under the law.
He also expressed concern over the decree’s use of automated legal presumptions to establish the principle of effectiveness. For example, the law requires that an ancestor (parent or grandparent) was born or resided in Italy under certain conditions. Dr. Laganà pointed out two major issues: (1) These presumptions do not reflect any actual connection between the applicant and Italy—no consideration is given to language, culture, or residency. (2) The required conditions refer to other individuals (parents or grandparents), not to the applicant themselves.
Dr. Laganà also criticized DL36 for deviating from the general civil principle of burden of proof. He recalled that the United Sections of the Court of Cassation reaffirmed in 2022 that: the petitioner must prove a continuous line of descent from an Italian citizen; and the state must provide evidence to the contrary if it contests the claim.
DL36 undermines this by prohibiting the use of witness testimony to establish certain requirements set by the reform—an incomprehensible limitation on tools normally available to claimants under civil procedure.In conclusion, he proposed a major procedural reform: that an administrative attempt at recognition should become a mandatory prerequisite before any court petition is allowed. Without a prior decision from a competent municipality, court actions should be deemed inadmissible and immediately dismissed without a ruling on the merits.
Professor Roberta Calvano: “DL36 Cuts Off Fundamental Rights with a Legislative Axe”
On April 9, the Senate’s First Commission continued its hearings on Decree Law No. 36/2025, welcoming testimony from Professor Roberta Calvano, a constitutional law scholar at La Sapienza University of Rome.
Professor Calvano delivered a firm critique of the legislative form chosen for the reform. In her view, the use of a decree law for such a sensitive and constitutionally significant matter is not appropriate. Although the government included a preamble outlining the reasons for urgency, she argued that none of the justifications amounted to an actual emergency as required by the Constitution. While the number of citizenship applications is large and increasing, she emphasized that volume alone does not justify emergency action, especially when the issue at hand is not a sudden or unexpected event, but rather a longstanding legislative and interpretative challenge.
She argued that the government did not merely suspend the current law pending reform—which might have been more defensible—but instead introduced a substantive change to the citizenship regime through emergency legislation, raising serious constitutional concerns.
Professor Calvano highlighted that citizenship rights are acquired at birth under the principle of iure sanguinis, and any subsequent declaration by a consulate or judgment by a court is simply recognizing a status that already exists. DL36, however, alters the substance of the law, introducing a new principle that combines iure sanguinis and iure soli—but only for individuals born outside of Italy. This, she argued, creates an unjustifiable discrimination between citizens of equal descent based solely on place of birth.
She also pointed to the provision requiring a two-year period of residence in Italy before the birth of a child, asserting that this creates an arbitrary distinction between families whose residency falls before or after the child’s birth, without any reasonable constitutional justification.
With regards to the “genuine link” criterion, Professor Calvano noted that while the law aims to establish a meaningful connection to the Italian national community, its application is narrow and incoherent. It applies selectively to certain generations and excludes others—especially third- and fourth-generation descendants, where such a link might be weaker but also more vital to nurture. The result, she argued, is a standard that is not only unreasonable but also discriminatory.
What Professor Calvano found most troubling was the sweeping nature of the reform, which she described as cutting off “millions of fundamental rights with a legislative axe.” She stressed that this was done through an emergency decree, outside of the ordinary democratic process, and with no adequate balancing of constitutional principles.
In her conclusion, she warned that changing the law on citizenship must be done with careful attention to equality, proportionality, and reasonableness. Failing to do so risks producing a law that generates multiple layers of unjustified distinctions, ultimately undermining the legitimacy and constitutionality of the entire reform.
Professor Enrico Grosso, Constitutional Law at the University of Turin
The final hearing closed with the remarks of Professor Enrico Grosso, who acknowledged the rationale behind the proposed reform. He openly recognized that a corrective was needed, particularly in light of the extensive jurisprudential interpretations that had progressively broadened access to Italian citizenship, placing increasing burdens on the State.
However, Grosso insisted on the need to balance two competing principles: the individual’s right to preserve meaningful ties with their country of origin, and the State’s legitimate authority to sever those ties when they become excessively tenuous. He recalled the European jurisprudence, which conditions the legitimacy of such restrictions on the existence (or absence) of a genuine link, typically measured by criteria such as effective residency, family relationships, and active participation in the social community. In Italy, this idea is echoed in Article 4 of the Constitution, which ties citizenship to one’s contribution to the national community.
Despite agreeing with the reform’s premise, Professor Grosso harshly criticized its legal structure, identifying two constitutional issues:
1. Retroactive denial of birthright citizenship
The reform denies citizenship to individuals who had already acquired it by birth unless they took legal action by a specified deadline. Grosso referred to this mechanism as a “scam of labels”, arbitrarily distinguishing between “valid” and “invalid” citizens. In his view, retroactively stripping a person of citizenship without remedy is blatantly unconstitutional, especially in the absence of any conduct attributable to the individual.
2. Violation of Article 22 of the Constitution
This provision prohibits deprivation of citizenship for political reasons. In Grosso’s view, the reform serves purely political ends, as it imposes a legal penalty on citizens without any personal action or omission on their part. The withdrawal of rights is entirely the result of a legislative choice, not individual responsibility.
He also emphasized a third critical issue with European implications: under the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU, any loss of national citizenship that affects EU citizenship must be accompanied by procedural safeguards and remedies. The individual must be given time and means to challenge or mitigate the effect of the loss. The draft law, as currently written, provides no such opportunity, and in Grosso’s view, this is its gravest flaw.
We will continue to follow the parliamentary process closely and will publish further expert opinions shortly on our website.
